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“The POW Will Safely Return!”
Second World War Allied and
German Propaganda Leaflets
Amber Lloydlangston and Tracy Lo

D

uring the Second World War, both
the Allied and Axis governments
expended significant resources in
the production and dissemination
of propaganda. Directed at their
own people, the propaganda of
these governments fostered correct
thinking, feelings, attitudes, and
behaviours. Directed at military
personnel of enemy nations as part
of psychological warfare operations,
this propaganda was far more subversive. Its goal
was to undermine the efficiency and coherence
of enemy forces and, ultimately, to weaken their
will to fight. Among the different media harnessed
to achieve this end, aerial leaflets hold a unique
place in the history of psychological warfare
operations. Their efficacy was debated during and
after the war yet these leaflets were disseminated
in the millions and collected by soldiers of both
sides.1 It is for this reason, among others, that
although inherently ephemeral, Second World
War leaflets have been preserved in archival
collections, including the George Metcalf Archives
of the Canadian War Museum.2 In the following
pages, we will highlight 12 leaflets from this
collection, six produced by the Psychological
Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force (PWD)3 and six by the SS
Standarte Kurt Eggers of the German Waffen SS
(SKE),4 all of which encourage enemy combatants
to surrender. But what arguments did the
psychological warriors of the opposing sides
think would convince their target audiences to
take this step? What inducements did they offer?
What justifications did they provide? And in what
ways were the leaflets produced by the opposing
sides different or the same?

This exercise is undertaken less
to compare the efficacy of the leaflets,
although we will address this issue
in our conclusion, and more to
explore the variety of considerations
that both sides attempted to balance
in their efforts to induce surrender.
We offer this analysis with due
caution for we recognize that our
sample is incomplete. While the
George Metcalf Archives holds
35 PWD leaflets which promote surrender, its
collection of corresponding German leaflets is
significantly smaller. Indeed, we show here the six
that are the least damaged. We also acknowledge
that we employ the English translations of the
original German leaflets that were prepared by
PWD in an effort to overcome the reluctance of
operational personnel to deliver, via aircraft and
artillery, what some referred to as “bumpf” or
“confetti” and others, slightly more colourfully,
as “bumwad.” 5 We cannot, therefore, make
definitive statements about the language use and
tone employed in these PWD leaflets.6 And yet
the similarities and differences are nonetheless
striking, indicative not only of certain shared
philosophies about propaganda techniques but
also of different attitudes toward the enemy
audience. Before turning to a detailed exploration
of the individual leaflets, we will first outline in
general terms their similarities and differences.
Whether Allied or German, both psychological
warfare organizations anticipated that soldiers,
not knowing how they would be treated as
prisoners of war, might be afraid to surrender. To
assuage this fear, two themes were stressed: 1)
respect for the terms of the Geneva Convention,
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and 2) the good conditions enjoyed by prisoners
of war. Recognizing that a sense of honour might
deter a soldier from surrendering, both sides
also emphasized that this act did not sully his
honour. To surrender did not imply cowardice
but rather was a step forced upon a soldier for
whom the alternative was, at worst, death and,
at best, permanent disablement. To increase the
leaflet’s persuasiveness, both sides featured not
only photographs of prisoners of war enjoying
comfort and security in their camps but also
quotes in which prisoners often express surprise
at, and always satisfaction with, their treatment.
Very simply, all 12 leaflets told their enemy
audience that the POW would be sure to return
home safely whereas the same could not be said
of the fighting soldier.
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Although the leaflets evince some similarities
in theme and technique, they also manifest
certain differences. The CWM sample suggests
that PWD presented more inducements and
justifications in advocating surrender to the
German soldier. Leaflets reminded him of Allied
material superiority, explained the meaning of
capitulation on a personal and national level, and
declared that desertion, requiring a particular
kind of courage not held by all soldiers, was an
acceptable route to a prisoner of war camp.7 The
leaflets produced by PWD and SKE also employ
a different tone. PWD leaflets attempted to reach
German soldiers by addressing them as rational
individuals capable of thinking for themselves
and of making sensible decisions once presented
with the truth.8 Truth, it must be noted, did
not dictate honesty; PWD adopted the axiom of
propaganda that to be persuasive, leaflets had to
be credible.9 In contrast, leaflets generated by the
propaganda units of the SKE were generally more
strident in tone. German propagandists used
language rich in superlatives and attempted
to play on the emotions of their
audience. That
they chose this
technique does
not necessarily
imply a lesser
commitment to
the truth. Indeed,
PWD experts have
argued that “Nazi
propagandists
had to observe the
rules of accurate
50376-0
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reporting, when they wanted to believed, just as
carefully as the Allies.”10 And yet at the same time,
one of these same experts noted that, according to
the Nazis, the job of propaganda was to “persuade
people to accept any given view favourable to
policy, irrespective of its truth or falsity.”11 For
the Nazis, truth as well as lies had a role to play.
The tone of certain SKE leaflets also suggests that
German propagandists attempted to establish a
sense of camaraderie with the enemy, an effort
which our sample indicates was not made by
PWD. While leaflets of the latter organization
promised good and fair treatment for POWs and
for Germany at war’s end, they did not suggest
that German and Allied soldiers should become
friends nor employ a tone which suggested a kind
of fellow-feeling as certain of the SKE leaflets did.
We will now turn to a detailed exploration of the
12 leaflets beginning first with the six produced
by the SKE and then turning to the six produced
by PWD.

German Leaflet Propaganda
Directed at the Allies

“G

ermany strictly observing Geneva
Convention” (AI – 069-7-44 12) was a
propaganda leaflet first distrubed in July 1944.
It states that even the bravest soldier may reach
a point where continued fighting would lead to
pointless self-destruction.13 A justifiable response
in such circumstances, and one that all nations
accept, is surrender. Should a soldier reach this
point, the leaflet continues, he should know what
will happen to him. First, he will be taken to a
Dulag, which although “no hotel,” is nonetheless
as comfortable as nearness to the front permits.
Here he will receive medical care, if needed, and
will
be given the opportunity
to send a message home.
Second, the soldier will
be transferred to a Stalag,
a permanent camp,
up-to-date, and with
all the conveniences.
These include: modern
kitchens in which to
prepare the ample
and high quality food
with which POWs
are provided; clean
and airy rooms,
which soldiers can
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decorate to their taste;
lavatories and toilets of
high sanitary standard;
and, athletic fields,
complete with sporting
equipment. Moreover, while
imprisoned in a Stalag,
prisoners will be given an
opportunity to learn a trade,
to pursue a university degree,
or to study fine arts. Third,
the soldier will no longer have
to fight. He “will return home
safe and sound after the war.”

“The P.O.W. will safely return!” contains the
subtle message that there is no dishonour
in surrender. The German propagandists’
attempted to enhance the leaﬂet’s credibility
and impact by featuring on its obverse a list of
33 dead, superimposed over which are
the words: “The Dead Will
Never Return!”

Perhaps anticipating that
some Allied soldiers might
remain unmoved by the
blandishments of leaflets in which
the German voice predominates,
another leaflet, “Excerpts from recent letters
from P.o.W’s.” (AI – 082-7-44), also disseminated
in July 1944, uses the voice of Allied personnel,
all identified by name and all but one by service
number.14 Supporting the leaflet’s central message
that wounded “P.o.W’s. are well treated,” these
excerpts all speak to the high quality medical
attention that these injured prisoners received
from the Germans. Like all of the leaflets, this
one also stresses that POWs “will return home
after the war.” It does, however, have yet another
more subtle message to communicate. The
following sentiment, purportedly penned by
Sapper K. Thompson, is the clearest expression
of this message: “[I]t seems so terrible that we
are fighting against one another.” Addressing the
sense of camaraderie that developed between
the supposed enemies, Rifleman H. Kidd wrote:
“We have made friends with lots of German
chaps, we have fine times trying to teach each
other our different languages.” Reinforcing the
idea of the links of friendship, brotherhood,
and camaraderie that could and should flourish
amongst Allied and German forces is the
photograph concluding the leaflet, showing two
German soldiers carrying a wounded American
soldier to a First Aid station. On another level,
this image also highlights the humanity of the
German soldier as proof of the fact that Allied
personnel, upon laying down their arms, would
have nothing to fear.
Stark in its simplicity, one of the leaflets
produced by the Propaganda-Einsatz-Fürher

Organization (∆ 137 5 4415) and
disseminated in May 1944, lists on one
side the names of prisoners of war, over which
is superimposed the words, “The P.O.W. will
safely return!”16 The obverse lists the names
of war dead, over which is superimposed the
words, “The dead will never return!” In addition
to the blunt statement that prisoners of war will
survive the conflict, the leaflet communicates
another, more subtle, message. Configured to
resemble a newspaper announcement, the list
of names of prisoners of war is capped with
the heading “The Roll of Honour.” In choosing
these words, the leaflet’s authors imply that the
decision to surrender is not a dishonourable one.
A deeper analysis reveals still more interesting
details: 31 of the 33 names of the dead, one of
which is repeated twice, can be verified using
the Commonwealth War Graves Commission
database.17 This suggests that the list of prisoners
of war is accurate. But does the accuracy of the list
of dead lead to believable propaganda? Is it likely
that soldiers who knew any of the 31 dead men
picked up the leaflet, read it, and subsequently
internalized the message that surrender was both
desirable and honourable? These are questions
for which we have no answers.
45
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Like Allied propagandists, the
Germans used photographs of
prisoners-of-war and quotes
from their letters to prove their
assertion that they respected
the terms of the Geneva
Convention.
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In terms of the number of photographs and
the amount of text that it features, “Men in the
Shadow? No—Men in the SUN!” (∆ 140/8 44),
disseminated in August 1944, is unique.18 While
only one of the other five leaflets includes a
photograph, this one has 21. It also features more
text than the other five leaflets, much of it recycled
from the others. As such, it states that those who
became POWs surrendered to avoid “senseless
self-destruction.” This choice was no reflection
on their bravery but rather evidence of their good
sense. The leaflet also includes the five “Excerpts
from recent letters from P.o.W’s” (AI – 082-744). As well, the leitmotif of German leaflets
promoting surrender is featured prominently as
the leaflet’s concluding line: “…[A]nd they all will
safely return!” The principle point of the leaflet,
however, is that Germany respects the terms
of the Geneva Convention. Using the text from
the leaflet entitled, “Germany strictly observing
Geneva Convention” (AI – 069-7-44), it discusses
the high quality living conditions, the abundant
and excellent food, and the opportunities for
self improvement and healthful exercise. The
21 photographs, from which healthy, active,
vital men smile at the viewer from the page,
are intended to illustrate the superior standard
of living enjoyed by Allied prisoners-of-war. Of
course, these images also are supposed to serve
as incontrovertible proof of Germany’s adherence
to the terms of the Convention.
The final two SKE leaflets to be considered
here are unique in that they were directed
specifically at Canadian soldiers. The first, asking
“Are Canadians Cowards?,”19 answers: “Never
has anybody dared to assert that. Even Canada’s
enemies rank Canadians among the world’s
best soldiers.” Why, then, did the leaflet pose
the question? The answer is found in another
passage, which states that official sources quote
the minister of defence, A.G.L. McNaughton,

as saying that more than 6,500 out of 16,000
newly-drafted Canadians deserted. These men
were not cowards, the leaflet asserts, but simply
sensible individuals who saw no point in fighting
in Europe, allied with Bolsheviks, when there
was work to be done on Canadian farms and in
Canadian industry. Somewhat incongruously,
the leaflet also notes that “men [were] wanted to
use dynamite for peaceful purposes,” describing
how this explosive was employed in the lumber
industry. Addressing Canadian soldiers directly,
the back of the leaflet declares: “You are again to
assume the offensive. In case you should come
into a hopeless situation don’t lose courage.
Germany treats prisoners of war according to
the (sic) Hague and Geneva Conventions. Your
soldier’s honour will be respected.” Its final shot:
“Better come across than get a cross.”
The final leaflet, disseminated in December
1944 and entitled “Soldiers of the First Canadian
Army Corps!” (* 383/12 4420), is more subtle
in that it does not explicitly call on Canadians
to surrender. 21 It does, however, imply that
surrender is the only way to survive the war.
Employing at first a wry, somewhat conspiratorial
tone, suggesting fellow feeling, it reminds
Canadians that “[f]or over a year you have been
in Italy and for more than a year you have been
travelling up and down this damned Italian boot.
You have fought one battle after another with ever
increasing losses.” Becoming sympathetic in tone,
it then reminds Canadians of the misery of that
past year of fighting, making specific reference to
particularly costly Canadian battles: “Remember
Ortona? You were ordered to take it and in the
course of bitter street fighting you suffered
ENORMOUS losses.” Switching to outrage, the
leaflet continues, “You were called again when
without regard for losses you were ordered to
break through German defences. Whenever big
losses were the order of the day the cry was:
CWM 19700149-001

The unknown Canadian who
preserved this leaﬂet, noting on its
face, “German propaganda ﬁred
over to us in shells,” apparently
viewed it more as a curiosity to be
saved as a souvenir than as an
inducement to surrender, despite its
avowal of German respect for The
Hague and Geneva conventions.
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German propagandists employed a cartoon, bolded text,
exclamation points, and emotional language in an effort
to create a sense of outrage in this leaﬂet’s Canadian
recipients. Note the code * 383 / 12 44, which identiﬁes
this leaﬂet as one produced by the Sudstern (Southern
Star) section of the Skorpion South Propaganda
organization, attached to the German 10th Army.

Allied Leaflet Propaganda
Directed at the Germans

L

eaflets issued by the Allied Psychological
Wa r f a r e D i v i s i o n ( P W D ) r e p e a t e d l y

includ
Germa

emphasised that captivity was no joke. A
soldier did not seek captivity “because the
life of a prisoner appealed to him,”22 but
because captivity meant safety. A pamplet
disseminated by the RCAF on the night
of 12/13 March 194523 declared: “Better
free than a prisoner of war. Better a
prisoner of war than dead.”24 Indicative
of the considerable overlap in themes
on the PWD leaflets, this one then
explains that the “1,000,000 German
soldiers in the West are now in safety”
because the Allies adhere to the
principles of the Geneva Convention.
After outlining what this adherence
meant in terms of the treatment of
prisoners of war, the leaflet then
instructed soldiers: “If you have
to quit, remove your weapons,
helmet and belt. Raise your hands,
wave something white and shout to the
Allied soldiers Ei Sörrender!” Use of the phrase
“if you have to quit” is interesting for it subtly
suggests that German soldiers could be forced
to surrender by circumstances beyond their
control. In such cases, being taken prisoner was
not dishonourable but an unfortunate necessity.
It reinforces the more direct statement: “Many
[of your comrades] came into captivity quite
against their will, but in a hopeless situation
they had to choose between death and life.” The
reader of the leaflet, it is inferred, must make
a similar decision. Equally interesting is the
German phonetic spelling of the English phrase “I
surrender,” which was included for two reasons:
1) to respond to the fear of the German soldier
that he would be killed trying to surrender25; and
2) “to make the German familiar and at home
with the idea of surrender, so that the switch-over
to action (would become) that much easier.”26

CWM 1994004-372

CANUCKS TO
THE FRONT” And all of this
for “foreign interests!” As an accompanying
cartoon clearly illustrates, Canadians were
sacrificial lambs, forced to fight when the British,
the Americans, and the Soviets each passed the
proverbial buck. The leaflet ultimately asks:
“Are you going to wait until thousands of your
pals and perhaps you yourself will drown in
the icy water of the mighty Po river (sic) which
is more than 5100 feet wide? Are you going to
wait until the rest of your division will freeze to
death in the ice-regions of the Alps?” The “only
one Canadian answer to all this”: “No! Finish up
with Europe. We want to go home. Remember;
The most important thing about a war is: To get
home alive!”

re
Ge
soldiers

Many of the leaflets in the ZG series
emphasized the good treatment received by
German prisoners of war. Like the German
leaflet, “Men in the Shadow?,” the PWD leaflet

48
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CWM 1994004-371

Like other Psychological Warfare
Division leaﬂets, “In Safety!”
recapitulates the main points of the
Geneva Convention so that German
soldiers would not be afraid to surrender.
To help them still more, the leaﬂet
includes the phrase “Ei Sörrender!,” the
German phonetic spelling of the English,
“I Surrender!”

ext,
ort
n
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hern
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entitled “What does the other
side look like? (ZG 113)”27 and
disseminated the night of 22/23
February 1945 over Losheim,
Lebach, and Saarbrucken,28
uses photographs to provide
visual support to the words
and so make its written
assertions more credible.
First noting that German
POWs had not fought any
less courageously than those
still fighting, it maintains that
they had been faced with a hopeless situation
and, as such, recognized that there was nothing
to be gained by continued fighting. Stating that
the Allies respected the Geneva Convention, the
leaflet continues: “The following series of pictures
gives a sober and factual description of the life of
captured German soldiers during the first days of
captivity.” The first photograph, showing a line of
captured German soldiers and captioned “This
can happen to anyone,” constitutes yet another
effort by PWD to accustom German soldiers to
the idea of surrender by implying that there was
no dishonour in it. The next five photographs
show men being fed their first meal in captivity,

receiving first aid, being transported to a transit
camp, undergoing processing as prisoners of
war, and busily writing letters to loved ones. But
it is the final graphic on the leaflet, a Red Cross
card and its accompanying caption, which are
particularly striking. Noting that a card is sent to
the Red Cross in Geneva and also to prisoners’
families, the final statement reads: “The card
contains nothing about the circumstances of
capture.” The underlying message of this leaflet?:
a German soldier and/or his family might
consider surrender to be shameful but official
Red Cross documents would not divulge how he
entered captivity.

This “sober and factual
description of the life of captured
German soldiers” also features
a facsimile of a Red Cross Card,
which the leaﬂet helpfully points
out “contains nothing about
the circumstances of capture.”
Clearly marked as a translation
of ZG 113, the Psychological
Warfare Division translated
leaﬂets like this to overcome
the reluctance of operational
personnel to disseminate them
instead of explosives.

49
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Sporting the seals of the
British and American armies
and a facsimile of Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s signature, this
leaflet seemed like an official
contract to many of its German
recipients. The Psychological
Warfare Division deemed it one of
its most successful leaﬂets.

Almost
all PWD aerial
leaflets emphasized the fact
that the Allies respected the terms
of the Geneva Convention. Of the leaflets
featuring this theme, however, “Safe Conduct
(ZG 76),”29 disseminated at the end of October
1944,30 is unique. Crafted and reworked over
time in response to comments from newlycaptured German soldiers, the “Safe Conduct”
pass was considered to be one of PWD’s most
effective leaflets.31 To make it appear official, the
leaflet was stamped with the seals of the British
and American armies along with a facsimile of
General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s signature. This
signature, historian James Erdmann maintains,
“transformed the leaflet from a simple appeal to
surrender into an official contract of conditions
binding both the soldier giving himself up and
those taking him captive.”32 Equally important

is the text. In English and German,
the front declares that the “German
soldier who carries this safe conduct
is using it as a sign of his genuine
wish to give himself up.” The soldier
carrying it, the leaflet continues,
is to be disarmed, well looked
after, fed, given medical attention
as required, and removed from
the danger zone as soon as possible. The
obverse of the leaflet outlines the “Basic Principles
of International Law Regarding POWs (according
to the Convention of The Hague, 1907, and the
Geneva Convention, 1929).” These are: 1) From
the moment of surrender, German soldiers are
regarded as prisoners of war; 2) Prisoners are
taken to assembly points away from danger; 3)
Prisoners receive the same quantity and quality
of food as Allied soldiers and the same hospital
care; 4) Prisoners’ valuables and decorations
are not taken from them; 5) Prisoners are
accommodated in facilities equal to that of Allied
garrison troops; and 6) Prisoners are subject
neither to reprisals nor to public curiosity.
Reflecting feedback from German POWs that they
had been uncertain how to surrender safely, the
leaflet concludes with “Rules for Surrender”: “To
prevent misunderstandings when surrendering,
the following procedure is advisable: Lay down
arms, take off helmet and belt, raise your hands
and wave a handkerchief or this leaflet.”

langu
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As we have seen, PWD leaflets repeatedly
suggested that surrender could be forced upon a
soldier, that it could happen to anyone, and that it
was not something about which a soldier should
be ashamed. In addition to advocating surrender,
however, PWD leaflets also presented desertion
as an option for the German soldier to consider.
But how did the leaflets make this option
palatable? If surrender could be interpreted as
not sullying a soldier’s honour, could desertion
also be so interpreted? One leaflet purporting to
use the voice of a deserter, “A So-Called Austrian
Troublemaker,” reads: “Yes, I am a deserter, but
I claim that a man sometimes needs a lot more
courage to desert than to keep sitting in his fox
hole.”33 The leaflet entitled, “In the North it Might
Have Made Sense (ZG 109),”34 highlights Allied
material superiority as a reason for wanting to
stop fighting and desert. Declaring “YOU TOO
CAN BECOME A PRISONER OF WAR,” it lists the
different routes to achieving this status: 1) in an
enemy counter-attack; 2) by a counter-attack of
one’s own; 3) while scouting on combat patrol; 4)
by an enemy flank attack; 5) by being cut off and
separated. Still another way was by “so-called
desertion: That is not something for everybody,”
the leaflet declares. “There are soldiers who
decide that by fighting on they cannot help
Germany and that post-war Germany will
need them for the job of reconstruction.
But to desert, one needs courage, iron
determination and—a proper opportunity.”
The leaflet concludes with the assertion:
“Prisoners of war return home
safely when the war is
over.”
CWM

W h i l e
leaflet ZG
109 touched
upon the fact of
Allied material
superiority, the

implications of this superiority for the individual
German soldier was hammered home in “When
All Hell Breaks Loose (ZG 82),” which was
disseminated over Dunkirk on the night of
13/14 November 1944.35 It tells him: “Today
you are still alive. You fight with insufficient
weapons, poorly equipped, surrounded by halftrained units. But—you are alive.” Pointing out
to the German soldier that “thousands of your
comrades, many of your own friends, have died,”
the leaflet reiterates three more times that the
soldier reading the leaflet was still alive. But for
how long? In the most emotion-laden language
of any of the PWD leaflets considered in our
sample, it continues: “Tomorrow all hell may
break loose…Tomorrow: sudden uninterrupted
barrages from guns of all calibres, continuous
dive-bombing, thousands of flying fortresses and
carpets of bombs; tanks, anti-tank rockets, and
the new flame throwers. Everything you have seen
so far was child’s play compared with
that. Tomorrow: Hell.” And
what of the day after

1994
0004
-374

With its emotion-laden
language, this Psychological
Warfare Division leaﬂet
emphasizes what Allied material
superiority would mean to the
poorly equipped German soldier:
death, permanent disability, or
capture. The smart soldier would
accept that conditions forced his
surrender.
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tomorrow? The leaflet states: “Day after tomorrow
it will be over and you will be either dead, a cripple,
or a prisoner of war. The decision about that is
perhaps in your own hands…WHAT IS YOUR
CHOICE?” The obverse of the leaflet asks the
soldier: “WHAT IS TO BE DONE?” Instructing
him to study the options in advance of battle so
that he will be prepared to make an instantaneous
decision, the leaflet outlines steps to follow for
individual and group surrender, noting that “to
avoid dangerous misunderstandings, the white
flag should be waved clearly.” It concludes by
outlining the treatment accorded to prisoners of
war by the Allies, a repetition of the main points
of the Geneva Convention.

Conclusion

O

bjects of curiosity to the social historian
today, were the 12 leaflets studied here
viewed in the same light by the soldiers who
picked them up during the Second World War?
Or did they play the subversive role for which
they had been designed? And can we determine if
Allied and German soldiers responded similarly
or differently to them? Although such questions
spring immediately to mind in any exploration of
leaflets, we recognize that we can offer only tentative
answers for analyses conducted at the time and
subsequently are themselves inconclusive. While
some respond with a resounding yes, others
disagree, and still others withhold judgment,
citing lack of adequate evidence. Fully cognisant
of the limitations of the exercise, we nonetheless
conclude with a brief exploration of the variety
of attitudes concerning the efficacy of aerial
leaflets, including the twelve
advocating surrender.
CWM
-022

0350
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As Allied forces moved into Germany, PWD
prepared leaflets that addressed both soldiers
and civilians. “What Capitulation Means (ZG
97),” disseminated over Saarbrucken and Borken
areas the night of 14/15 January 1945, and
which outlines what this act meant and what it
did not mean on both a small and large scale, is
an example of this type of leaflet.36 On a small
scale, the leaflet explains, capitulation meant that
German soldiers recognized “the hopelessness of
the local situation” just as Allied commanders had
done in Singapore, Tobruk and on Corregidor.
For this same reason, German surrenders had
taken place “in the East and West where it was
recognized, strictly for military reasons, that
further loss of life was no longer justified.” At
the same time, a small scale capitulation did
NOT mean that the soldier “will be subject to the
enemy’s whim,” for “he is protected by the Geneva
Convention which contains detailed instructions
regarding his treatment, food, shelter, etc. and
provided…that prisoners of war must be returned
home as soon as possible after the peace has been
signed.” On a large scale, capitulation meant
that the “hopelessness of the overall situation is
being recognized.” This section also served as an
opportunity to declare in no uncertain terms the
war aims of the Allies: unconditional surrender
and “No promises and no dealings with the Nazis!”
On a large scale, capitulation did NOT mean
mass retaliation against all Germans. Quoting
President Roosevelt, the leaflet reads:
“The United Nations do
not intend to
enslave

the German people. It is our desire to give
the German people an opportunity to become
useful, and respected members of the European
community of nations.” While the front of the
leaflet notes that soldiers who capitulate will
be treated “with full honors (sic),” the obverse
is photographic proof of this statement. It is
captioned: “With full military honours the
surrender of 19,000 German soldiers took
place in Central France on 17 th September
1944. The picture shows (right) an American
Major-General returning the salute of a German
Major-General and an American Colonel. The
German staff is in the foreground.” The reverse
of subtle, this leaflet and others like it constituted
a response to Goebbels’ propaganda, which
told the German people that “defeat meant
total physical destruction of Germany, the total
impoverishment of its economic life, and the total
reign of unrelieved terror for its inhabitants.”37
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Those who argue that PWD leaflets were effective
rely on a number of different sources of evidence,
one of which was the Nazi response to the Allied
leaflet campaign. The threats and punishment
meted out to those soldiers found harbouring
leaflets proved, as an Office of War Information
indoctrination pamphlet entitled “Leaflets—
Propaganda in Battle Dress” declared, that the
“Hun didn’t regard leaflets as harmless. He hated
and feared leaflets. Indeed he threatened, cajoled,
punished and generally went to a great deal of
trouble to try and prevent them from being read.
And why? Because he knew that one single leaflet
falling into the right hands may do large and
lasting damage.”38

CWM
-022

0350

1980

The efficacy of PWD and SKE leaflets can
be demonstrated sufficiently, some argued both
during and after the war, through anecdotal
evidence. For example, James Erdmann
maintains that comments made by Obergefreiter
Erwin Griesbach, an “unimportant Wehrmacht
soldier” who surrendered voluntarily on 26
February 1945, proved that tactical and strategic
leaflets were effective in combination. Griesbach
reported that he “had been impressed with the ‘Ei
Sörrender’ leaflet, the English phrases of which
he had been practising against the possibility
that his unit would be surrounded.” He also
informed his interrogators that “[t]he leaflet
helps the Landser to cross the bridge between
wanting and not wanting to. It makes the decision

easier for him by showing him the way.”39 For his
part, German propagandist SS Obersturmfuerer
Fernau, responding to criticisms of the work of
Skorpion West,40 wrote on 15 November 1944 that
“[t]he success of our work is beyond question and
has been confirmed from the highest authorities,
whilst recently some Ic’s have confirmed it by
advising us of their suspicion that some enemy
units have been withdrawn temporarily or
permanently from the front-line as a result of
our propaganda.”41 In the same vein, assessing
in 1954 German propaganda directed against
the French, Paul Leverkuehn concluded that
leaflets had been successful: “[I]t was confirmed
by the interrogation of prisoners and from other
sources that these subversive pamphlets had, in
fact, found their way to the troops; many of the
prisoners still had the leaflets in their possession
and produced them in support of their claims for
preferential treatment.”42
But not all authors agree that the
aforementioned evidence was sufficient to prove
the efficacy of propaganda leaflets. For example,
addressing the Nazi response to Allied leaflets,
professor Edward A. Shils, who served with the
American Office of Strategic Services during the
Second World War, suggests that it should be
attributed “more to the hypersensitivity of the
Nazis, who themselves greatly overemphasized
the importance of propaganda, than to the
actual responsiveness of the miserable Germans
53
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to whom they were addressed.” 43 Rejecting
prisoner of war feedback as adequate proof
of the effectiveness of Allied leaflets, Charles
Cruickshank argues in The Fourth Arm:
Psychological Warfare, 1938-1945 that to have
asked captured German personnel if they had
been affected by propaganda likely would have
only elicited the response that the prisoners
believed their captors wished to hear.44 For his
part, SS Obersturmfuerer Fernau, selective in
his acceptance or rejection of anecdotal evidence
depending on whether it proved the efficacy
of German leaflets or not, similarly distrusted
prisoner of war comments. He maintained
that, rather than eagerly providing the desired
response as the German POW was believed to
have done, the Allied prisoner of war scornfully
denied being affected by “Nazi propaganda.”45
Arguments for and against the efficacy of leaflet
propaganda are plentiful. Equally numerous
are those who argue that it is impossible to
conclude whether or not leaflets were effective.
Thus, Anthony Rhodes in Propaganda: The Art
of Persuasion in World War II, maintains that
for propaganda to have been effective, affected
individuals should not have realized that they
had even assimilated the message.46 Determining
the efficacy of such propaganda would have been
impossible. For his part, Daniel Lerner argues
that there simply is insufficient evidence to
prove the efficacy of leaflets. He also maintains,
however, there is equally insufficient evidence to
disprove their efficacy.47
In our assessment of leaflet efficacy, however,
we accept that argument which holds that
although difficult to measure, leaflets likely
had “some demonstrable and helpful results if
the surrounding military circumstances were
favorable.”48 Even when bolstered by military
successes, propaganda leaflets would not have
spurred immediate action. Instead, they operated
through a process of gradual attrition of the
opponent’s morale. For this reason, some argue,
German propaganda enjoyed success in France
in 1939 and early 1940.49 Similarly, there is
reason to believe that PWD leaflets played a role
in encouraging Wehrmacht soldiers to surrender
in the final months of the war. And it is for this
reason that we suggest that SKE leaflets very
likely had only limited impact on Allied personnel
in 1944-45. Vicious as the fighting was during the
last year of the war, the Allies achieved success

after success, and the anecdotal evidence which
records Allied scepticism seems tenable. While
the leaflets were often read, particularly if they
were amusing, the majority of them probably did
end up as toilet paper.50 “Bomber” Harris may not
be the most representative Allied serviceman but
his comments regarding German leaflets are still
worth quoting: “Our reaction to pamphleteering
had always been to jeer and at the most to keep
some of their leaflets as souvenirs.”51
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